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WAITING FOR THE MOUNTAIN TO COME TO DOE: EXISTING
OPTIONS FOR COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AND NUCLEAR UTILITIES REGARDING THE DISPOSAL
OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

TIMOTHY P. CAIRNS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 ("NWPA" ' obligated the
federal government to accept Spent Nuclear Fuel ("SNF") or High-Level
Radioactive Waste ("HLR )3 after a suitable long-term storage repository
became operational.4 For the past fifteen years, the government has
focused its efforts to create a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, 5 and
has currently completed the Viability Assessment and Draft
Environmental Impact Statement for the site.6 By the terms of the NWPA,
the Department of Energy ("DOE") entered into contracts with all
* Mr. Cairns received his B.S. from Mount Olive College in Wilmington,
North Carolina,
in 1997 and expects to receive his J.D. from William and Mary School of Law in May
2002. Before entering law school, Mr. Cairns served as a reactor operator in the United
States Navy and worked as an instrument technician at a commercial nuclear facility.
I Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982,42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-270 (1994).

2 See id. § 10101(23). "The term 'spent nuclear fuel' means fuel that has been withdrawn
from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not
been separated by reprocessing." Id.
3See id. § 10101(12).
The term "high-level

radioactive waste" means: (A) the highly

radioactive material resulting from the reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel, including liquid waste produced directly in reprocessing and any
solid material derived from such liquid waste that contains fission
products in sufficient concentrations; and (B) other highly radioactive
material that the Commission, consistent with existing law, determines
by rule requires permanent isolation.
Id.
4
See id. § 10131.

5 See id. § 10172(a).
6 OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT, U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY, DOE/EIS0250D, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR A GEOLOGIC REPOSITORY FOR
THE DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE AT

YUCCA MOUNTAIN, NYE COUNTY, NV (1999) [hereinafter YMP DEIS].
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operating commercial nuclear utilities in the United States to begin to
accept SNF on January 31, 1998; the expected operational date of the
Yucca Mountain facility. 7 The federal government failed to meet the
obligations of these contracts, and several utilities have brought separate
actions in federal court seeking damages for the delay.8 In Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Co. v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit affirmed a Court of Federal Claims ruling that held the
federal government liable in contract for this breach. 9
Currently, the vast majority of nuclear utilities store SNF at the
facilities that create the waste. Government projections indicate that the
repository at Yucca Mountain will not be operational until at least 2011a date DOE officials concede is conditioned upon the numerous
recommendations, approvals, and appropriations still required.' 0 As a
result, commercial nuclear utilities will continue to store SNF "on-site" for
at least the next ten years. This arrangement creates excessive economic
hardship for the utilities, with particular hardship apportioned to those
utilities that have ceased operation and need SNF removed to complete
decommissioning." As a temporary remedy, at least one commercial
7 See

42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(5).
Contracts entered into under this section shall provide that-(A)
following commencement of operation of a repository, the Secretary
shall take title to the high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel
involved as expeditiously as practicable upon the request of the
generator or owner of such waste or spent fuel; and (B) in return for
payment of fees established by this section, the Secretary, beginning
not later than January 31, 1998, will dispose of the high-level
radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel involved as provided in this
subtitle.

Id.

See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 374 (1999); Yankee
Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223 (1998).
9 225 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
8

10 See Nuclear Waste Litigation: Hearing to Examine the Impacts of the Recent United
States Federal Circuit Court Appeals Decision Regarding the Federal Government's
Breach of Contractfor Failure to Accept High Level Nuclear Waste by January 1998
Before the Comm. on Natural Res., 106th Cong. 6-8 (2000) (prepared testimony of Ivan

Itkin, Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, DOE) [hereinafter
Itkin Testimony].

I See, e.g., Nuclear Waste Litigation: Hearing to Examine the Impacts of the Recent
United States Federal Circuit Court Appeals Decision Regarding the Federal
Government's Breach of Contractfor Failure to Accept High Level Nuclear Waste by
January1998 Before the Comm. on NaturalRes., 106th Cong. 20-24 (prepared testimony

of Russell A. Mellor, President and CEO, Yankee Atomic Electric Company and
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company) [hereinafter Mellor Testimony].
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utility has entered into a contractual agreement with the DOE for financial
consideration for the future storage of SNF on-site. 12 But it is unclear
whether this agreement conforms to the guidance of contracts between the
DOE and commercial nuclear utilities for the removal of SNF, especially
after the Court of Appeals decision in Maine Yankee. 13 Further guidance
is required from the federal government regarding future disposal plans
and methods for interim storage.
This Note attempts to consider the elements of an equitable bargain
between the DOE and nuclear utilities for the disposal of SNF and the
environmental, economic, and public perception costs of each of these
elements. Section II of this Note traces the historical background of the
proposed storage of SNF from the NWPA to the current agreements,
including legislative amendments and court challenges. 14 Section III
analyzes the legality and enforceability of the agreements based upon the
terms of the NWPA and the remedies proscribed by recent judicial
decisions. 15 Section IV addresses the expected elements of this and future
agreements and will provide recommendations for an equitable bargain
that will satisfy participants and other interested parties. 16 Finally, in
Mellor's testimony reveals that the Yankee companies-Yankee Atomic, Connecticut

Yankee, and Maine Yankee--only remain as individual entities to oversee the
decommissioning of defueled reactor sites in the communities of Rowe, Massachusetts,
Haddam, Connecticut, and Wiscasset, Maine, respectively. Id. According to Mellor:
Because of the government's breach of its commitment to timely
remove spent fuel, the Yankee companies will have to stay in existence
and maintain the spent fuel on their sites for an extended period of
time. Because of the government's breach, the Yankee companies
have spent or will spend hundreds of millions of dollars to build and
operate special, independent, long-term storage facilities ("ISFSIs") to
maintain the spent fuel that the government has failed to remove.
Interim storage at reactor sites is extremely costly to utilities and their
ratepayers. Moreover, under the current federal program, such
"temporary" storage could end up extending to 50 years or more. This
situation can be avoided if DOE would meet its obligation and start
removing spent fuel from commercial reactor sites.
Id. at 24.

Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, First Agreement Reached
with Utility on Nuclear
Waste Acceptance (July 20, 2000), available at http://www.energy.gov/HQPress/rele
ases00/julpr/pr00186.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter DOE-PECO
Announcement].
13See Maine Yankee, 225 F.3d
at 374.
14 See infra Section II.
15 See infra Section
III.
16 See infra Section IV.
12
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Section V of the Note draws conclusions and predicts the adequacy
of any
7
utilities.1
nuclear
and
DOE
the
between
settlements reached
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

The NWPA and Amendments

In the early days of the nuclear power industry, Congress assigned
responsibility for management and disposal of civilian radioactive waste
to the federal government.1 s Radioactive waste presented little concern
19
because of the early plans to recycle virtually all fission products.
However, the federal government banned all programs related to spent
fuel reprocessing during the Carter administration, and the 1979 partial
meltdown at Three Mile Island further exacerbated environmental
concerns. 21 During the early 1980s, Congress began an effort to amend
the Atomic Energy Act to address the dilemma of nuclear waste. In the
NWPA of 1982 Congress proposed disposal of SNF and other HLR in a
centralized repository allowing the waste to remain undisturbed for
thousands of years.22
The 1982 NWPA provided a broad overview of the federal plan to
solve the SNF storage dilemma. It created the Office of Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management ("OCRWM") as administrator of the
infra Section V.
See generally Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2013-75 (1994).
19 H.R. REP. No. 491, pt. 1, at 27 (1982).
20 Id.
21
Id.
22id
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 10131(b) (1994). The NWPA Findings and Purpose section defines
the purpose of the Act as:
(1) to establish a schedule for the siting, construction, and operation of
repositories that will provide a reasonable assurance that the public and
the environment will be adequately protected from the hazards posed
by high-level radioactive waste and such spent nuclear fuel as may be
disposed of in a repository; (2) to establish the Federal responsibility,
and a definite Federal policy, for the disposal of such waste and spent
fuel; (3) to define the relationship between the Federal government and
the State governments with respect to the disposal of such waste and
spent fuel; and (4) to establish a Nuclear Waste Fund, composed of
payments made by the generators and owners of such waste and spent
fuel, that will ensure that the costs of carrying out activities relating to
the disposal of such waste and spent fuel will be borne by the persons
responsible for generating such waste and spent fuel.
17See
18
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program 23 and specifically required the DOE to investigate and select
three candidate sites for the long-term repository. 24 To fund the program,
Congress authorized the DOE to charge nuclear utilities fees for the future
construction of the repository and long-term storage of the SNF.25 These
fees were assessed as both a one-time charge dependent on the amount of
SNF already stored on-site and a one-mill levy on each kilowatt-hour of
electricity produced by a nuclear power plant in the future.2 6 At the end of
FY 2000, the fees contributed to the Nuclear Waste Fund ("NWF") totaled
27
$15.2 billion.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987
("Amendment") significantly modified the 1982 NWPA after much public
debate over the siting of the repository. The Amendment had two
significant impacts on the future of SNF management. First, it limited the
candidate sites for the long-term repository to only one planned at Yucca
23

Id. § 10224. The OCRWM was created within the DOE and is headed by a director,

appointed by the President, who reports directly to the Secretary of Energy.
Congressional oversight is provided by required annual reports to Congress, as well as
audits by the Comptroller General. Id.
24 Id. § 10132(a). Originally, the drafters of the NWPA envisioned more than one site for
repositories, and it appears the problem presented by transportation was considered at an
early stage. The candidate site description expressly mentions these factors in describing
the guidelines for site selection. "Such guidelines also shall require the Secretary to
consider the cost and impact of transporting to the repository site the solidified high-level
radioactive waste and spent fuel to be disposed of in the repository and the advantages of
regional distribution in the siting of repositories." Id.
25 Id. § 10222(c).
26 Id. § 10222(a). Thus, a commercial power-producing reactor of average size (e.g., 650
MW) would contribute $15,600 to the fund for power sold during each day of operation.
In ratepayer terms, a typical residential user of nuclear generated power (e.g., 1000 kWh
per month) contributes one dollar each month to the fund if the costs are passed directly
to the customer.
27 MARK HOLT, CRS ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, CIVILIAN NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL:

IB92059 (July 30, 2001), available at http://www.cnie.org/nle/waste-2.htm (last visited
Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter CRS Waste Brief]. Holt relies on the most current year's
Congressional Budget Request from the DOE. According to Holt:
Through the end of FY 2000, utility nuclear waste fees and interest
totaled $15.2 billion of which about $5.5 billion had been disbursed to
the waste disposal program, according to DOE, leaving a balance of
$9.6 billion in the Nuclear Waste Fund. Another $2.3 billion was owed
by utilities for spent fuel generated before 1983. The nuclear waste
program's appropriations for FY 1983-FY 2000 total about $6.7
billion, according to DOE, including $1.2 billion for defense waste
disposal.
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Mountain, Nevada. 28 After 1987, the DOE invested all resources in the
establishment of the repository in Nevada. In addition, the Amendment
required the DOE to enter into contracts with nuclear utilities to take title,
transfer and store SNF and HLR no later than January 31, 1998.29 Under
standard contractual terms, a set schedule of damages was stipulated in the
Amendment for any "temporary" delay in the operation of the
repository.3.
B.

Legal Challenges

Nuclear utilities have grown increasingly concerned over the delay
in opening the permanent repository in Yucca Mountain. Faced with
limited space available to store SNF on-site, utilities recognize the
urgency in expediting the actions of the DOE. 31 For several years
following the Amendment, utilities lobbied the DOE and Congress to open
a temporary facility to accept SNF on an interim basis, 32 but these actions
have been unsuccessful. On May 3, 1995, after reviewing comments of
28 42 U.S.C. § 10172 (1994).

The original NWPA established a schedule for siting,
constructing, and operating two repositories for the disposal of SNF. Id. One site was to
be located in the West and the second site constructed was to be in the East. The DOE
identified a number of sites for potential repository development in the West in 1983,
including sites at Yucca Mountain, Deaf Smith County, Texas, and Hanford, Washington.
Id.
29 Id. § 10222(a).
30 See Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level
Radioactive Waste, 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2001). Article IX of the Standard Contract
releases parties from liabilities associated with unavoidable delays and specifies equitable
adjustment of costs and fees for delays avoidable by the action of one party. The
unavoidable delays section states "[n]either the Government nor the Purchaser shall be
liable under this contract for damages caused by failure to perform its obligations
hereunder, if such failure arises out of causes beyond the control and without the fault or
negligence of the party failing to perform." Id. The unavoidable delays section continues
to list possible examples including acts of God, fires, floods, etc. The avoidable delays
section states:
(I]n the event of any delay in the delivery, acceptance or transport of
SNF and/or HLW to or by DOE caused by circumstances within the
reasonable control of either the Purchaser or DOE or their respective
contractors and suppliers, the charges and schedules specified by this
contract will be equitably adjusted to reflect any estimated additional
costs incurred by the party not responsible for or contributing to the
delay.
Id.
31 See Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223, 228 (1998).
32 See id.
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concerned utilities, the DOE responded by publishing its "Final
Interpretation of Nuclear Waste Acceptance Issues." 33 In this "final"
response to its critics, the DOE stated that "it does not have an
unconditional statutory or contractual obligation to accept [SNF]
beginning January 31, 1998 in the absence of a repository or interim
storage facility constructed under the [NWPA]. ' 34 Further, the DOE also
stated that it would not be liable to help utilities defray the costs of
construction or operation of on-site temporary storage facilities. 35 Faced
with no administrative or legislative recourse, the utilities turned to the
courts.
As the deadline for the DOE acceptance of SNF neared, several
utilities brought actions to force the DOE to begin to take title and
transport waste from the reactor sites. 36 The United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia disagreed with the DOE's
explanations for delay in IndianaMichigan Power Co. v. United States, 37
the first of many challenges to the justifications of the "Final
Interpretation." The court held that section 302(a)(5)(B) of the NWPA
created an obligation for the DOE, which was reciprocal to the utility
obligation to pay, to start disposing of the SNF no later than January 31,
1998.38 Although the decision fell short of the specific relief hoped for by
the utilities,3 9 it represented a significant victory over the DOE and
signified a possible future contractual challenge to the government.
No matter how attractive the potential future damages may have
appeared, the utilities were still facing possible plant shutdowns due to the
overflow of SNF storage capacity. In Northern States Power Co. v.
Department of Energy, a nuclear utility petitioned the circuit court for a
writ of mandamus to direct the DOE to begin disposal services by January
31, 1998.40 Again, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
33 60 Fed. Reg. 21,793 (May 3, 1995).
34 Id.
35 Id.at 21,797.
36

See, e.g., Northern States Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1016 (1998); Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. United States, 88
F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
3788

F.3d at 1272.

Id. at 1277. For the text of Section 302(a)(5) of the NWPA, see 42 U.S.C. §
10222(a)(5) (1994).
39 Indiana Michigan Power, 88 F.3d at 1277. At the time of the decision
(prior to
January 31, 1998), the DOE had not yet defaulted upon the contract so the court refused
to take any further action. Id.
40 128 F.3d at 754.
38
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ruled that the DOE would be liable for unspecified damages for failing to
begin the removal of fuel by January 31, 1998 without qualification or
condition. 4 1 The court stopped short, however, from requiring that the
DOE actually begin moving the waste to existing facilities, 42 but instead
suggested the DOE begin to work out a remedy with each utility pursuant
to the Standard Contract and the NWPA.4 3 In order to deflect similar
arguments by the DOE, a writ of mandamus was issued to prevent the
its delay on the grounds that it had not yet
DOE from attempting to excuse
44
prepared the storage facility.
After the 1998 deadline had passed without the acceptance of
waste by the DOE, a consortium of three New England utilities possessing
shutdown reactors brought the first of potentially many breach of contract
suits against the government.45 The U.S. Court of Federal Claims, in
Yankee Electric Co. v. United States, held the DOE liable for breach of
contract in its failure to accept the waste, and ordered the DOE to pay the
shutdown utilities for the storage costs for SNF. 46 However, another later
court of federal claims denied similar costs to a
decision by a different
47
Minnesota utility.
41 Id. at 758.
42 Id. at 760.

Utilities have urged that the DOE should move the waste to federal

facilities in Barnwell, South Carolina, and Idaho Falls, Idaho. Id. These facilities have
been accepting transfers of nuclear waste from military application and foreign
overnments under the non-proliferation treaties. Id.

Id.
44 See id. at 761.
45 Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 223 (1998).
46

Id. at 232.
See Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 374 (1999). The court in
Northern States Power Co. relied on the language of the contract in finding that utilities
must seek administrative remedies under the terms of the contract before independent
legal action could be brought. Id. In supporting the government's defense, the court
stated:
The provisions set forth in the Standard Contract were the product of an
extensive notice and comment period. It must be assumed therefore that
those provisions-and the remedies they specify-accurately reflect the
intentions of the contracting parties. And, even if those remedies seem
unexpectedly to fall short of what the parties originally (but perhaps
mistakenly) had envisioned, deference to the administrative process
dictates that the contracting agency, as the party charged by Congress
with fulfillment of the Act's goals, be given the first opportunity to
rectify the problem. It is DOE's decision that was'bargained for; not
ours.
It would therefore be an unwelcome intrusion upon the
administrative process-indeed, an unlawful intrusion-were this court
47

2001]

WAITING FOR THE MOUNTAIN TO COME TO

DOE

During the Yankee Electric appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, the DOE made the same arguments that had been
ineffective at the lower court level.48 First, according to the DOE, all
claims related to delays in performance should be addressed using the
"avoidable delays" clause of the "Standard Contract., 49 The government
contended that the use of the word "any" in the delays clause covered not
only short-term delays in performance but even the failure to begin
performance. 50 Alternatively, the DOE insisted that utilities did not have
standing to challenge the government in federal court because the terms of
the Standard Contract require utilities to explore51 administrative remedies
before bringing a challenge in the federal courts.
The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. appeals court rejected both
of these arguments, 52 although it was the administrative claims argument
that seems to have held sway on the Minnesota federal claims court. 53 In
rejecting the governments claim that the avoidable delays clause in the
contract should relieve them from any damage responsibility, the court
stated:
The provision is not a general one covering all delays, but a
more limited one dealing with specified kinds of delays,
namely, those "in the delivery, acceptance or transport" of
nuclear waste. These involve particular delays involving
individual contractors. They are the kinds of delays that
routinely may arise during the performance of the contract.
For them to arise, however, the parties must have begun
performance of their obligations relating to disposal of the
nuclear waste.54

to side with the plaintiff in saying that the administrative remedy
appears unsatisfactory and therefore may be disregarded in favor of a

breach action in this court.
Id. at 386.
48 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336 (2000).
49 Id. at 1341. For the text of the delays clause of the Standard Contract, see Standard
Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste, 10
C.F.R. § 961.11 (2001).
50 Maine Yankee

51

Atomic Power Co., 225 F.3d at 1336.

Id. at 1340.

Id.
See Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 374, 386 (1999).
54 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 225 F.3d at 1341.
52
53
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As the DOE never began performance, the court believed that delay
provisions in the contract should not be controlling. 55 Similarly, because
the court held that the utilities did not have to rely on the disputes clause
of the contract, they had no obligation to exhaust administrative
remedies.56
The Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. decision may be only the
first of many legal challenges in the Court of Federal Claims for the DOE.
In his most recent testimony before the Nuclear Waste Technical Review
Board, the acting director of the OCRWM acknowledged that fourteen
cases are currently pending against the DOE requesting damages caused
by the delay in accepting SNF and HLW.57
C.

Legislative Action/Agreements

During the past few years in Congress, several bills have been
presented to the legislature in an attempt to deal with the nuclear waste
problem.5 8 During the 106th Congress, both the Senate and the House
attempted to address the nuclear waste dilemma. 59 Both House Bill 45
and Senate Bill 1287 adopted as a common goal the attempt to establish an
interim storage facility at Yucca Mountain or another DOE site that could
begin to accept waste.6 House Bill 45 was significantly more aggressive
in support of the Yucca Mountain Project, including provisions that
required the DOE to take title to SNF currently stored on utility sites and
preemption doctrines to prohibit state and local actions to prevent
6
implementation of the waste law. 1

55 See id.
56 See id. at 1342.
57 See Lake Barrett, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Mgmt.,
U.S. Dep't of Energy,
Presentation to the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, Status of the Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management Program (Jan. 30, 2001), available at
http://www.rw.doe.gov/rogdocs/speeches/trb-1-01/trb-I-Ol.htm (last visited Dec. 1,
2001) [hereinafter Barrett Presentation].
58See generally H.R. 45, 106th Cong. (1999);
H.R. 1270, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 104,
105th Cong. (1997).
59 See H.R. 45,106th Cong. (1999); S. 1287, 106th
Cong. (2000).
60
See S. 1287, 106th Cong. (2000).
61 H.R. REP. No. 106-155, pt. 1 (1999).
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As a compromise, Senate Bill 1287 was passed by both the House
and Senate of the 106th Congress. 62 The major provisions of Senate Bill
1287, as passed by the Senate and the House included:
A requirement that the DOE begin accepting waste at
surface storage facilities at Yucca Mountain as soon as
practicable
after the NRC grants a repository construction
63
permit.
* Authorization for the DOE to settle deadline claims with
utilities by providing spent fuel storage casks at reactor
sites and compensating utilities for their additional on-site
storage costs.
* An adoption of a specified timeline to expedite the
approval process for the Yucca Mountain site.
Creation of the DOE Office of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Research to identify and conduct research on technologies
for the5 treatment, disposal, and recycling of SNF and
6
HLR.
The Congress presented Senate Bill 1287 to President Clinton and,
in accordance with a prior stated position, the President vetoed the bill on
April 25, 2000. In his message to Congress regarding the veto, the
President stated his belief that the bill did nothing to promote the
establishment of the Yucca Mountain site and created further unfunded
responsibilities for the DOE.66 An attempt at an override failed in the
Senate. 67 Other Congressional actions have attempted to specifically
62 S. 1287, 106th Cong. (2000) (Passing the Senate February 10, 2000 by vote of 64 to

34; passing the House of Representatives without amendment on March 22, 2000 by vote
of 253 to 167).
63 The NRC deadline for the construction permit is January 31, 2006. Id.
64 Secretary of Energy would be required to determine the suitability of Yucca Mountain
by the end of 2001, the President would be required to make a final recommendation on
the site by March 31, 2002, and the NRC would meet the deadline stated supra note 63.
Id.
65 Id. See S. REP. No. 106-98 (2000).
66 146 CONG. REC. S3017 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 2000) ("Report of the Veto of the Nuclear
Waste Policy Act of 2000-Message from the President").
67 S. 1287, 106th Cong. (2000) (voting 64 to 35 not to override veto on May 2, 2000.
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compensate utilities for the storage of SNF on-site, but never received the
approval of the entire Congress.
Faced with the defeat of the courts after the Maine Yankee Atomic
Power Co. decision, the DOE made several attempts at compromise.
Beginning in 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson attempted to
advance a plan whereby the DOE would take title to SNF and pay utilities
a temporary storage fee to leave the SNF at the reactor sites. 69 Nuclear
industry officials were openly hostile to such a plan mainly because it did
little to advance their ultimate goal-the removal of SNF from reactor
sites as required by the Standard Contract.
But officials from several
utilities have begun negotiating with the DOE on this and other proposals.
The single agreement reached to date is an agreement between the
DOE and PECO Energy (now Exelon Energy) announced on July 21,
2000.71 The agreement was formed as an amendment to the contract
between the DOE and the utility, similar to contracts required by the
NWPA for all nuclear utilities.72 According to the DOE press release, the
amendment to the contract "allows PECO to reduce the projected charges
paid into the NWF to reflect costs reasonably incurred by PECO due to the
department's delay. '' 73 The statement reveals that PECO could reduce
74
their charges by up to $80 million over the next ten years.
The specific terms of the Amendment do much more than allow
PECO to reduce payments to the NWF. The Amendment instructs the
DOE to take title to the SNF currently stored at the Peach Bottom Nuclear
Plant at an ISFSI and to pay PECO the reasonable costs of operating the

68
69

H.R. 1309,106th Cong. (1999).
See The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1999: Hearings on HR. 45 Before the House

Subcomm. on Energy and Power of the Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 180-84
(1999) (prepared testimony of Bill Richardson, Secretary of the Dep't of Energy)
[hereinafter Richardson Testimony]. The Secretary estimated the costs of such a plan
would be approximately $2 to $3 billion through 2010. Id.
70 See, e.g., Mellor Testimony, supra note 11.
71 See DOE-PECO Announcement, supra note 12. PECO operates commercial reactors
at their Limerick and Peach Bottom facilities. The agreement applies only to the Peach
Bottom plant. Id.
72 See Standard Contract for Disposal of
Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level
Radioactive Waste, 10 C.F.R. § 961.11 (2001). The Standard Contract existing now in
the Code of Federal Regulations has not been modified since its inception as the

enforcement of the NWPA. Ironically, the Contract still lists the date required for
removal of SNF as January 31, 1998. Id.
73DOE-PECO
74 _

Announcement, supra note 12.
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ISFSI. 75 Contrary to the stated intention of the DOE to assume physical
possession of all SNF, the Amendment specifically requires PECO to
maintain physical possession of the SNF until the operating license of the
76Thsou
facility expires. This would prevent the DOE from actually transferring
the SNF to Yucca Mountain or other designated facility until at least
2019. 77 And although the Amendment applies only to SNF stored at
may deduct costs from its payments to the NWF for
Peach Bottom, PECO
78
all of its facilities.
Still, the Amendment has great value for the DOE. The terms state
that PECO release and discharge the DOE "from any and all claims it may
have arising out of the [contract] relating to DOE's delay in performance
of its disposal obligations for Peach Bottom SNF/HLW . . . .,,79 As
mentioned earlier, the DOE has stated an intention to negotiate with other
utilities using the PECO Amendment as a template. 80 No other utilities
have agreed to such an amendment at the present time.
III.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE AGREEMENTS

A.

Remedies Required by Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.

75 U.S.DEP'T OF ENERGY, AMENDMENT TO CONTRACT DE-CROI-83 NE44405 BETWEEN
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND PECO ENERGY COMPANY (July 19, 2000), at

http://www.rw.doe.gov/0903_Amendment.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter
DOE-PECO AMENDMENT]. In pertinent part, the Amendment states:
Transfer of Title. Subject to the conditions and limitations listed
below, DOE shall take title to Peach Bottom SNF/HLW, the storage
casks and the Peach Bottom ISFSI in which they are stored ....DOE
shall only take title to Peach Bottom SNF/HLW that is contained in a
dual-purpose cask system certified by the Commission for storage and
transport .... DOE shall not be immediately obligated to take physical
possession of any of [the casks] ....PECO Energy shall allow such
SNF/HLW or SNF/HLW in casks to remain at its then current location
until it is removed in accordance with the Removal Schedule.
Id. The Removal Schedule is the published order in which SNF is ultimately to be
transferred to the long-term repository. Id.
76Id.at 8.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 10.
79 Id. at 15.
80 See Itkin Testimony, supra note 10. "We are actively working with utilities in an
effort to resolve [the contractual obligation] issue and the ongoing litigation, and we
reached a settlement with PECO Energy Company this July." Id.
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As stated earlier, the appellate court deciding the Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Co. matter specifically prohibited the DOE from relying on
the "unavoidable delays" clause in the contract to escape liability. 81 In
effect, the court declared the contract breached and ordered DOE to pay
damages. 82 Armed with a court finding of a breached contract, utilities are
unlikely to rush to sign up for any contract amendment with DOE without
terms that are specifically beneficial to the utilities and detrimental to
DOE.
Certainly in the matter of the New England Yankee facilities and
other shutdown nuclear reactors, it is obvious that such an agreement
would have no beneficial effect. The Yankee Atomic Electric Co. Court of
Federal Claims decision required the DOE to pay for the costs of storage
of SNF, including costs incurred retroactively and into the future. 83 In
past litigation, the Yankee companies have sought over $288 million in
damages in their contract action to compensate the utility for storage
through 2010-the date when SNF is predicted to begin shipping to
Nevada. 84 By all estimates, this figure is conservative. These utilities are
prevented from putting the facility to any other use while the SNF is
stored in fuel pools or other locations on site.85 The utilities may also
have an action for the taking of their property by the DOE, an argument
advanced by the Yankee companies in the lower court hearing but not
appealed.86
For operating reactors, the costs of storage that appear to be
recoverable by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. decision are not as
clear. 87 Fuel assemblies that are removed from the reactors are typically
stored in a "fuel pool" on site for at least five years. 88 This allows the
burned up fuel to cool, both thermally and radioactively, so that it may be
81 See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336, 1342 (2000).
82

Id.

83 42 Fed. Cl. 223, 232 (1998).
84 See Mellor Testimony, supra note 11.
85

Id.

86See

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 225 F.3d at 1339.

87 Id. All three utilities participating in the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. decision

administered only shutdown reactor sites and were required to pay operational no per

kWh cost to the NWF. Id.

88 See NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REV.

BD., DISPOSAL AND STORAGE OF SPENT

NUCLEAR FUEL-FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE

OF ENERGY,
(March
1996),
available at http://www.nwt
rb.gov/reports/storage.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter NWTRB 1996
SECRETARY
REPORT].
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transferred without undue risks to facilities and personnel.8 9 The original
plan for reprocessing fuel required that spent fuel be stored for a period of
at least five years to allow for cooling, then the SNF could be transferred
to a reprocessing facility. 90 The dilemma now confronting the utilities is
that the designed fuel pools hold only a limited amount of SNF. 91 Some
Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") estimates find that over 70% of
commercial power producing nuclear reactors may
require shutdown by
92
2010 if alternatives are not adequately developed.
Today the trend, encouraged by the NRC is to store SNF in dry
storage casks on site.93 The properly cooled SNF assemblies are
transferred to metal casks made of non-corrosive materials, filled with
inert gases, and sealed.94 The dry storage casks are then stored on site in
89

Id.

90See LUTHER J. CARTER, NUCLEAR IMPERATIVES AND PUBLIC TRUST: DEALING WITH
RADIOACTIVE WASTE 61 (1987).
91 See NWTRB 1996 REPORT, supra note 88. The NWTRB Report describes in detail

the dilemma facing nuclear utilities in storing spent fuel:
By the end of 1995, approximately 32,000 metric tons of spent fuel had
been generated by commercial nuclear reactors located at 70 sites
nationwide. Unless a significant number of reactors shutdown early,
spent fuel will continue to be produced at a rate of roughly 2,000 metric
tons per year through the year 2010. If there are not a significant
number of reactor license extensions, the rate of spent fuel production
will slowly decline thereafter until the last of the presently operating
reactors reaches the end of its scheduled 40-year lifetime sometime in
the 2030s. By that time, the amount of commercial spent nuclear fuel
will total approximately 85,000 metric tons (DOE 1994). The practice
at all commercial reactors is to store the newly discharged spent fuel in
pools on site for at least five years to allow for initial cooling.
However, the total pool storage capacity nationwide is only about
60,000 metric tons. This means that, if a repository does not become
available, storage capacity of approximately 25,000 metric tons in
addition to pool storage will have to be provided somewhere over the
next 35 years to accommodate commercial spent fuel.
Id.
92 See NUCLEAR REG.

COMM'N,

SPENT FUEL POOL AND FULL CORE OFFLOAD

at http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/drycask/sfdata.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001)
(listing all operating commercial nuclear reactors, core sizes, fuel pool capacities, and
remaining fuel pool capacities current as of November 4, 1998).
93 See NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, ONSITE STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR
FUEL, at
CAPABILITY,

http://www.nrc.gov/OPA/drycask.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001). "Dry spent fuel storage
in casks is therefore considered to be safe and environmentally sound, and it is also
becoming cheaper and may provide, in some cases, substantial cost benefits for a licensee
and its ratepayers." Id.
94 See id.
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what is termed an ISFSI. 95 NRC has expedited the approval of ISFSIs by
declaring that any commercial reactor is approved to store SNF in dry
casks on site by virtue of its existing operation license. 96 Even without the
independent review of the extra spent fuel storage, the NRC has promoted
the construction of ISFSI by individual utilities as safer than existing fuel
pool storage.97
In addition to regulatory approval, commercial nuclear utilities
must also fund the design, construction, and future operation of the ISFSI.
The costs of purchasing and storing such dry casks are extremely high for
a number of reasons. First, the NRC has approved a limited number of
casks, although with NRC support the number'is growing rapidly. 98 Next,
the utilities must pay the extra costs associated with security and
construction of a suitable place to house the facility. The casks must be
suitably remote to not expose workers to excess radiation, but they must
also be sited so that security personnel can easily monitor them. 99 Some
utilities simply do not have the available ground space for such an
arrangement.' 00 Utilities must train personnel for the transfer of SNF
assemblies to the dry casks and the ultimate transfer to the transportation
canister when a permanent repository becomes available.10 1 Finally, the
utilities must comply with existing state laws that, in some cases,
specifically
prohibit the storage of SNF onsite after a specified number of
02
1
years.
B.

Requirements of the NWPA

95 See id.
96

See 10 C.F.R. §§ 72.16, 72.18, 72.24 (2000) (listing application requirements

including elimination of any previous reports or studies submitted to the agency); see
also Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501, 1521 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the NRC's failure
to provide a site-specific analysis of the use of a dry cask storage system did not violate
the requirements of NEPA).
97See NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, supra note
93.
98 See 10 C.F.R. § 72.214 (listing approved spent fuel storage casks).
99

See id. § 72.122.

100 See Mellor Testimony, supra note 11.
101 OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, REPORT
TO THE COMMITTEES ON APPROPRIATIONS: PLAN FOR TRANSPORTATION CASK
FABRICATION AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF WASTE ACCEPTANCE CAPABILITIES (Jan. 2001),

available at http://www.rw.doe.gov/WAT1l128alll.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2001)
lhereinafter DOE TRANSPORTATION PLAN].
02 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A § 4371 (West 1999) (limiting the
amount of
time that SNF may remain on-site at reactor to three years).
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When Congress established the NWF by the 1987 Amendments to
the NWPA, it intended the money collected to be solely devoted to the
construction and operation of the permanent repository at Yucca
Mountain.' 0 3 The amounts collected by the DOE are in no way
discretionary and are fixed by statute enacted by the Congress and signed
into law by the President. 0 4 The NWPA authorizes the Secretary of
Energy to make disbursements from the waste fund for only limited
purposes including construction, research, administrative
and
°
transportation costs.1
With regard to adjustments to the fee charged
utilities, the NWPA does give the Secretary discretion to evaluate and
adjust the fees.' 0 6 The Act specifically states, however, that such an
adjustment proposal .must be immediately transmitted for review and
possible disapproval. 0 7 It is reasonable to assume that if Congress
insisted to be informed of any adjustment to the overall rate charged
utilities, then it would expect to be involved in the decisionmaking process
for other adjustments; even adjustments to individual utilities such as
those endorsed by the PECO-DOE Amendment.
It is clear from the express language of the NWPA that Congress
could not anticipate any attempt by the Secretary to excuse a utility's
contributions to the fund as damages for not accepting SNF by the stated
deadline. 108 The DOE may attempt to justify such deferments by stating
that they are simply damage payments that would be made to the utility as
a consequence of the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. decision. But this
decision was binding only on the plaintiffs in the Maine Yankee Atomic

103

42 U.S.C. § 10222(a) (1994).

14

Id.

105

Id. § 10222(d).

106 Id. § 10222(a)(4) (acknowledging that: "[t]he Secretary shall annually review the

amount of the fees established by paragraphs (2) and (3) above to evaluate whether
collection of the fee will provide sufficient revenues to offset the costs as defined in
subsection (d) of this section").
107 Id. The NWPA states that:
In the event the Secretary determines that either insufficient or excess
revenues are being collected, in order to recover the costs incurred by
the Federal Government that are specified in subsection (d) of this
section, the Secretary shall propose an adjustment to the fee to insure
full cost recovery. The Secretary shall immediately transmit this
proposal for such an adjustment to Congress.

Id.
108

42 U.S.C. § 10222(a) (1994).
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Power Co. action, specifically three utilities in New England.10 9 As to any
other utility, the award of any expected damages is only speculative, as no
court action has been taken at this time, although at last count fourteen
cases are pending in the Court of Federal Claims. 10 Payments from the
NWF on the basis of the Standard Contract are also inappropriate based
upon the court holding in Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. that
specifically denied the government's attempt to use the delay clause in the
contract" '1
Further, it is unclear if these payments meet the specific statutory
requirements for disbursements from the fund. 12 Although potentially
classified as administrative costs, it is unlikely that Congress intended that
payments for damages should be labeled as administrative.' 13 In 1998,
Secretary of Energy Federico Pena proposed a settlement to the utilities,
114
much like the proposal advanced in the PECO-DOE Amendment.
Significantly, the past proposal did not seek to forgive payments to the
NWF, but only to defer the contributions until the DOE began its required
contractual duty to accept the waste." 5 Apparently with the litigation
109

See generally Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. v. United States, 225 F.3d 1336

(2000).
110 See Barrett Presentation, supra note 57.
11See Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 225 F.3d 1341.
112 42 U.S.C. § 10222(d).
113Id.

See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Energy, SecretaryPena Proposes Relieffor Nuclear
Utility Contract Holders (May 18, 1998), available at http://www.rw.doe.go
v/announcements/newslstl/news05-18-98/news05-18-98.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
115 Id.Actually, only a portion of the fees would be available for deferment. According
to the DOE:
[U]nder the proposed settlement, a portion of the quarterly fee payment
would be postponed until the Department is ready to accept the utility's
spent fuel sometime in the future. A utility would pay only its
proportionate share of the fees needed to cover the budget approved by
the Congress to administer the civilian nuclear waste program each
year. A utility would remain obligated to pay the withheld fees, with
interest at the Treasury rate, when the Department begins the receipt of
its spent fuel. Until then, a utility would be able to invest withheld
funds in investment-grade financial instruments and use any earnings
greater than those owed to the government to pay for its costs resulting
from the Department's delay in accepting the spent fuel. The
Department estimates a benefit of approximately $2.8 to $5 billion to
all utilities.
Id. Currently, with the budget of the OCWRM set to increase enormously as construction
of Yucca Mountain commences, the proportionate share that would be eligible for
deferment by this scheme is relatively small.
114
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ongoing during this period, utilities were in no hurry to accept the
settlement offer from the DOE. Nor are they rushing to accept the DOE's
current offers, instead relying on the decisions of the courts. An
amendment to the NWPA, proposed and approved by Congress, should be
required before utilities and the DOE are allowed to enter into any type of
bargain that limits contributions to the NWF.
C.

Third Party Actions

Another consideration for the DOE and Congress when deciding to
authorize the storage of SNF onsite at reactor sites across the country are
the third party effects of such storage. A significant amount of public
controversy6 surrounds the decision to site the repository at Yucca
Mountain.
Both state and federal legislators representing Nevada have
promised to fight the establishment of the repository in Nevada 117 and
public support against such a project is certainly high. But Nevada is only
one state in the union. In countless other areas, public support cries for the
shipping of nuclear waste to some other area, preferably the area already
designated by the federal government. 118
These third party actions may become court challenges to the
agreements between the DOE and utilities. In one such third party
challenge brought in 1994, several private citizens of Michigan challenged
the decision by the NRC to approve dry cask storage at the Pallisades
facility.' 19 Although the plaintiffs did not prevail on their core challenge
to the effectiveness of the NRC review of the site, the defendant utility
also challenged the plaintiff citizens' standing to bring such a suit.'20 The
Court of Appeals ruled that such independent citizens did have standing if
the actions of the government and the NRC directly affected their
116 See, e.g., NEVADA NUCLEAR WASTE PROJECT OFFICE, TRANSPORTATION OF SPENT
NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE TO A REPOSITORY FACTSHEET

(May 20, 1999), at http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/trans/trfact03.htm (last visited Dec.
1, 2001) [hereinafter NNWPO FACTSHEET].
117 Cf.James Eli Shiffer, Evaluating Nuclear Risk, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, NC),

Aug. 27, 2000, at Al (analyzing the dilemmas faced by a local nuclear plant in expanding
the size and storage capacity of its existing fuel pool).
118 See, e.g., Bob Susnjara, Kirk Decries Zion Nuclear Waste, Hopeful Hastert Wants
Repository Built in Nevada, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Oct. 24, 2000, at 4. ("U.S. House
Speaker J. Dennis Hastert resumed the call Monday to get rid of nuclear waste that
remains at ComEd's shuttered plant in Zion.").
119 Kelley v. Selin, 42 F.3d 1501 (6th Cir. 1995).
120°d. at 1503.
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property. 12 1 In this matter, it may be likely that landowners near a nuclear
facility proposing long-term dry storage of SNF may have similar standing
to delay any such agreement between the DOE and utilities.
Not all such citizen suits meet with success in asserting standing,
especially those based upon contracts. In order to bring an action based
upon a third party beneficiary theory, the third party must prove that the
contract in question reflects the express or implied intention of the parties
to benefit the third party. 122 In another recent citizen suit, several citizens
brought a third party action against the DOE for its failure to remove the
SNF from a nearby reactor site. 123 As ratepayers of Northern States Power
Company, the plaintiffs asserted that they were third party beneficiaries to
the Standard Contract between the DOE and their local utility. 124 The
court disagreed and refused to grant standing to the citizens as third party
the Standard Contract never mentioned the
beneficiaries because 25
1
ratepayers individually.
Perhaps if the citizens in Roedler had asserted some type of
personal harm or injury due to the effect of long-term storage of SNF, they
would have been more successful in their action. The recent trend in
environmental cases is to allow suits by private citizens where some
personal "injury in fact" is asserted. 126 For plaintiffs, it is not necessary to
show physical injury, although some harm greater than "general
averments" and "conclusory allegations" must be demonstrated.' 27 The
Supreme Court, in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, held that
environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they use an
at 1508.
122 See Montana v. United States, 124 F.3d 1269, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
123 Roedler v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, Civil No. 98-1843 (DWF/AJB), 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21613, at *2 (D. Minn. Dec. 23, 1999).
124 Id.
125 Id. at * 15. Not only did the court analyze the contract, but also the associated statutes
121 /d.

for a mention of ratepayers. In describing their findings, the court stated:
[N]ot only is the NSP Standard Contract itself lacking in any mention
of ratepayers such as the plaintiffs, but the statute and regulations in
question are similarly devoid of any reference to ratepayers as an
intended beneficiary. Instead, the NSP Standard Contract and the
NWPA, with its accompanying regulations, refer only to intended
obligations and benefits between DOE and the owners and generators
of spent nuclear fuel, and to an intention to benefit and protect the
general public welfare and the environment.
Id.
126 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000).
127 See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
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affected area and the aesthetic and recreational value of the area is
decreased due to some protested activity.' 28 For the plaintiffs challenging
long-term storage of SNF, this burden should be eased by the reality that
most nuclear facilities are sited in remote areas and near large bodies of
water; areas ripe for aesthetic and recreational value.
Additionally, states operate as third parties to the agreements
between the DOE and utilities. While efforts toward energy deregulation
are proceeding throughout the nation, nearly every state of the union still
has a public utility commission established to oversee the electric utility
business. In many cases, such as the ongoing litigation in New England
concerning the Yankee nuclear facilities, these PUCs function nearly as
co-plaintiffs with the utilities, attempting to advance state interests over
those of the federal government. 29 Other state environmental agencies
may also become plaintiffs or participate as amicus curiaeto derail the onsite storage plans of utilities. 3u Furthermore, when state legislators debate
the appropriateness of new facilities for storage of SNF at reactor sites,
they can exercise significant public opinion pressure against utility
plans. 13 1 Ultimately, as they have in the past, these debates may lead to
32
new regulations to prevent or restrict the construction of such facilities. 1
Finally, other utilities may qualify as third parties to any
contractual challenges between a single utility and the DOE. Because the
NWF is a collective arrangement between all nuclear utilities and the
DOE, a reduction in fees from one utility can be viewed as detrimental to
other NWF contributors.
Courts have addressed the problem of
inequitable sharing from a collective pool of money recently. 133 In a
matter before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a consortium of
several electric utilities sought to block, excessive payments to an
individual manufacturer by the DOE from a fund set up to distribute
128
129

See Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., 528 U.S. at 182.
See Northern States Power Co. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 374 (1999).

Amicus

briefs supporting the position of Northern States against the DOE filed by approximately
twenty public utility commissions. Id.
130 See, e.g., Seema Mehta, State Panel Delays Vote on Waste Storage at San Onofre
Plant, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 15, 2000, at B3.
131 See, e.g., Judy Fahys, Measures Aim to Stop Nuke Waste; Plan Would Block Storage
of Rods on Goshute land, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 3, 2001, at A8.
132 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation and Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190 (1983) (holding that California could prohibit construction of new nuclear
lants in the state until long-term repository for SNF was developed).
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Richardson, No. 99-1436, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
35446
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 29, 2000).
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billions of dollars recovered by the government as a result of price
controls on petroleum products.' 3 4 Plaintiff utilities argued that they had
standing to challenge any award made by the DOE from the collective
fund. 135 The lower court had dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, on the grounds plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge an
award to a third party.' 36 While not ruling that the utilities had standing to
challenge the award to a third party, the appellate court held that enough
for dismissal and the case was
of an interest existed to survive a motion
37
remanded for further investigation.1
While the NWF does not make awards to contributing nuclear
utilities, because the expenses of the fund are real and fixed, amounts
forgiven from one party must be recouped through the contributions of
other utilities. Moreover, because the NWF fees are fixed by statute, the
courts will ultimately adjudicate member challenges to adjustment of fees
for individual utilities."'
134
135

Id. at *8.
Id. at *10-11.

The argument, summarized by the court, reads at the applicable part:

Plaintiffs assert that they have stated a claim upon which relief can be
granted and that they have standing to appeal because if Chesebrough
does not get the money, the money will go back into the pool and thus
increase the Plaintiffs share. As a result, argue Plaintiffs, they have
sufficient stake in the outcome to confer standing. DOE counters that
Plaintiffs have not stated such a claim and that as third parties, they
have no standing to appeal the award to Chesebrough.
Id.
136
137

Id.at *1.
Id.at *18. The court summarized its ruling as follows:

DOE has already determined that Plaintiffs are proper claimants,
entitled to a share of the pool. Thus, to the extent that the award to
Chesebrough was excessive, the excess comes directly out of the
awards to Plaintiffs. Under these particular circumstances, Plaintiffs
should be entitled to challenge the award to Chesebrough.
Id. The court did recognize the danger of this apparently increased finding of standing:
We recognize that this opens the door to the possibility of an endless
series of challenges to awards, resulting in interminable delays in
closing the book on this effort at government intervention in the
marketplace. We think that such further delays are unlikely .... Only
when a large claim is involved and there is clear evidence of error,
would it pay a claimant to litigate an award to another.
Id. The court did not elaborate on how large a claim would be prudent or under
what evidence a claim may be upheld.
138 See Barrett Presentation, supra note 57. Several utilities have
recently stepped
forward to challenge the DOE-PECO Amendment. In his most recent address to the
NWTRB, the acting director of the OCRWM mentioned the proposed litigation:
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Certainly the core part of any bargain between the DOE and
utilities regarding the temporary storage of SNF on-site will be the fees
contributed by the utilities to the NWF. As investor-owned corporations,
most utilities have as their direct interest the maximization of their profits
for shareholders and an attempt to recoup some of the money lost to the
storage of SNF. However, as discussed previously, from the perspective
of the DOE, the deferment of payments to the NWF may not be a legal
element of any bargain.' 3 9 Regardless of the ultimate judicial decisions
concerning the authority of the DOE to negotiate deferments, it is not
sound fiscal policy on the part of the DOE to interrupt the payment of
utilities into the fund.
Currently, the NWF has a balance of $9.6 billion and each year, as
the process for approving the Yucca Mountain Project delays, more
money is disbursed from the fund. 140 For many years the DOE has
supplemented the amounts spent for YMP and other OCRWM activities
from the Defense waste appropriations account.14 1 Because the Defense
Department will be a significant customer of the repository when it is
complete, the amounts paid by Defense for the approval and construction
of the facility are entirely appropriate.' 42 But, because the balance
remaining in the NWF decreases annually, these appropriations from
Defense are not up to the task of funding the entire approval, construction,
transportation, and storage project.
A recent congressional research report estimates the following
costs for completion of the Yucca Mountain Project:

The PECO settlement was an effort by the [DOE] to responsibly
address the delay in our ability to begin acceptance of commercial
spent nuclear fuel. However, a recent lawsuit by approximately a
dozen other utilities challenges our authority for the adjustment of
charges that Exelon will pay into the Nuclear Waste Fund. We intend
to defend the PECO settlement in the courts.
Id.
139 See supra Section III.
140 See CRS WASTE BRIEF, supra note 27.
141 Id.
142 See YMP DEIS, supra note 6, at A-22.
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*

Estimated costs to complete the repository design and
licensing process, and build, operate, monitor, close,
and seal the repository-$ 18.7 billion

*

Estimated costs of expanding the current repository to
accommodate expected additional waste beyond the
current limit, if authorized-$4.5 billion

" Estimated

costs of transporting waste to Yucca

Mountain-$6.7 billion
" Payments to states-$3.2 billion
*

143
Management-$2.5 billion

Therefore, the total estimated future costs are $36.6 billion in
constant 1998 dollars. 144 This is a best case scenario analysis as well. The
DOE considers the funding of the repository as adequate and on schedule.
In December of 1999, as part of the required statutory review process, the
OCRWM determined that the fee charged to civilian producers of SNF
was marginally adequate to pay the costs of the program. 45 This report
makes clear however, that future projections are based in many cases upon
financial trends that are much more favorable than the historical
averages. 146 The audit also makes no concessions for any permanent or

143 JAMES E. MIELKE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: PROPOSED HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR

(May 27,
1999), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Waste/waste-30 (last visited Dec. 1,
2001) [hereinafter CRS YMP REPORT].
144 Id.
145 See OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT., U.S. DEP'T
OF ENERGY,
WASTE REPOSITORY: YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE CHARACTERIZATION PROGRESS

REPORT ON ASSESSMENT OF FEE ADEQUACY BASED ON FY 1999 TSLCC UPDATE, TDR-

CRW-SE-000003 REV 1 (1999).
146 Id. at 24.
This assessment concludes that the 1.0 mill per kWh fee is sufficient at
this time for Cases 1 and 2. However, future economic conditions may
vary from the forecasts used in this analysis, and costs may vary due to
future changes in program scope. This analysis used forecasted
(CRWMS M&O 1999a) real interest rates that remained above the
historical average for the entire analysis period. In the future real
interest rate forecast may decline toward its historical average.
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temporary deferment of fees as authorized by the DOE-PECO
Amendment.
If past overruns and increases are any indication, the NWF will need to
be significantly larger than the amounts projected here. The NWF can not
spare any interruption of its funding from its only source-the fees paid by
utilities for the construction and operation of the repository. In fact, the
March 1996 report of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, an
independent agency set up by NWPA to oversee the actions of the DOE,
recommended increasing the amounts paid into the NWF by contract
holders in order to meet the increasing costs of the program. 47
Title, Transfer,and Storage

B.

As stated earlier, the overriding goal of the NWPA is to allow the
DOE as the representative of the government to take title to the SNF,
transfer the waste to a designated repository, and store the waste long-term
for disposal.' 48 All actions of the DOE to the present in negotiating
contracts, planning and design of Yucca Mountain and resolving the
with the nuclear utilities seem in accord with this stated
current disputes
9
purpose.

14

In 1999, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson attempted to
negotiate with the utilities to begin this process.15 0 As a representative of
the DOE and the federal government, Richardson proposed that the DOE
would take title to the SNF at reactor sites across the country and pay the
utilities a fee for the storage. 151 Unfortunately as with past attempts for
settlements, buoyed by the recent victories in court, utilities were not
amenable to a bargain such as this.' 52 Ultimately this resolution failed
147

See NWTRB 1996

REPoRT,

supra note 88. The report states:

Given current funding projections, it appears that the Nuclear Waste
Fund will be only marginally capable, at best, of supporting the longterm development and operation of a repository for the permanent
disposal of spent fuel. Therefore, the costs of a limited federal storage
facility could be recovered through a new fee assessed on the users of
that facility .... This would avoid having the taxpayer bear the costs of
final closure of the repository.
Id.

148 See Nuclear
149/Id.
150

Waste Policy Act of 1982, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-270 (1994).

See Richardson Testimony, supra note 69.

151

Id.

152

See, e.g., Mellor Testimony, supra note 11.

432

WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.

& POL'Y REV.

[Vol.26:407

because the utilities recognized that the action of taking title to the waste
was a relatively small step in the process of delivering the waste to the
repository, and a step that utilities believed was of little value.
The concept of taking title to the SNF does have significant value,
however. It requires the DOE to provide payment for the dry storage
containers and transfer of SNF at those utilities that require more fuel pool
space. 153 It also requires the DOE to pay for the construction of facilities
to store and monitor the dry casks of SNF and requires the DOE to pay for
security and administrative costs associated with the storage., 54
Nevertheless, even if it may be a financial incentive to utilities, the taking
title bargain is poor economics. Paying utilities to purchase equipment
and facilities for short-term use makes little sense when the costs of the
equipment are exorbitantly high.' 55
Currently only a handful of
manufacturers make dry casks and the production of such equipment has a
long lead-time, ultimately increasing the price.' 56 Further, with the
guidance on the ultimate storage vessels only in the planning stage, this
purchase of numerous dry casks may be abandoned in a few years if the
dry casks are not suitable for transportation and long-term storage.' 57
Both the DOE and the nuclear utilities project extremely high
transportation costs when the SNF finally begins transport to the
repository; as noted above these costs comprise nearly 20% of the
projected costs of the YMP. 158 If the DOE wishes to bargain for an
153 See, e.g., DOE-PECO AMENDMENT, supra note 75, at 11.
154 Id.
155 MARK HOLT, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
SPENT FUEL
TEMPORARY STORAGE OPTIONS (Mar. 27 1998), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CR
Sreports/Waste/waste-20.cfm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter CRS TEMPORARY
STORAGE REPORT]. Citing a study by the Electric Power Research Institute ("EPRI"), the
report estimates that:
[D]ry storage capital costs [would range] from $350,000 to $500,000

for each concrete cask or module .... Each U.S. reactor discharges an

average of about 20 tons of spent fuel annually, so a reactor that had
filled its pool storage [70% of reactors by 2010] would need to spend
an average of $700,000 to $1.3 million per year to construct additional
dry storage capacity. If DOE does not take any spent fuel from reactor
sites until 2010, nuclear utilities will need dry storage facilities for
about 10,000 metric tons . . . therefore, total reactor dry storage

construction costs could reach $350-650 million by 2010 and double by
2020.
Id.

156 See DOE TRANSPORTATION PLAN, supra note 101, at 13 & app. A.
157 See generally YMP DEIS, supra note
6.
158 See CRS YMP REPORT, supra note 143.
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element that would not be wasteful economically, it may begin
negotiations regarding transportation to an interim facility. The current
administration has stated its intention to continue the opposition to any
proposal that requires shipment of SNF to an interim facility in Nevada. " 9
Nevertheless, the DOE operates facilities in Georgia and Idaho that are
currently accepting SNF shipped form overseas as part of the nuclear nonproliferation doctrine.' 60 These facilities could accommodate a limited
amount of SNF transferred from especially needy facilities. Facilities that
are preparing to decommission and are waiting on the transfer of SNF may
fit into this category.
The DOE has recently released its consolidated plan for the
transfer of SNF from utilities to the repository at Yucca Mountain. 161 in
the plan, the DOE describes the expected measures to be taken in the
future for the transportation of waste to YMp.162 Little more than a plan
of research, the report calls on contractors to provide analyses as to the
163
most efficient means of cask fabrication and transfer to the repository.
Because this planning is in a stage of infancy, the contractors and the DOE
both could benefit from actual transfers of SNF to an existing facility.
This would provide the future contractors and the DOE with effective data
on which to base the costs and logistics required for future transfers.
Regardless of the inevitability of the shipping of SNF under any
plan, opposition to transfer of SNF by the public is extremely high.' 64 The
planning of the long-term repository in Nevada mobilized local opposition
159 See Barrett Presentation,

supra note 57.

160 See DOE TRANSPORTATION PLAN,

supra note 101, at 5.

In May 1996, the Department of Energy, in cooperation with the U.S.
State Department, initiated a program under which spent nuclear fuel
and target material at research reactors in 41 countries, containing
uranium that was enriched in the United States, could be shipped to two
DOE facilities, the Savannah River Site (SRS) and the Idaho National

Engineering and Environmental Laboratory (INEEL), for management
pending permanent disposition. This program supports the U.S.
nonproliferation objective to reduce and eventually eliminate highly
enriched uranium in civil commerce. The spent nuclear fuel is entering

the United States through Charleston Naval Weapons Station in
Charleston, South Carolina and the Concord Naval Weapons Station in
Concord, California. To date [January 2001], 18 shipments have been
successfully completed, 15 to SRS and three to INEEL.

Id.
161

See id.

162

See id.

See id. at 9.
164 See, e.g., NNWPO
163

FACTSHEET,

supra note 116.
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to the government's proposals rather quickly, and slowly the rest of the
nation has begun to realize that the SNF and HLW will need to be shipped
on the roads and rails throughout the country.' 65 Some groups have
stressed that allowing the SNF to cool significantly on-site will minimize
the dangers from accident or sabotage during transport. 166 Many groups
have expressed concern that the Draft EIS for the Yucca Mountain Project
did not address concerns raised in the transport of SNF.167 The plan does
go into great detail regarding the possible transportation methods and
routes, 168 but ultimately does not provide conclusive guidance on routes
69
and methods.1
Transportation of SNF and/or HLW is probably the single largest
issue that unites parties in opposition to any plan that requires mass
movement of nuclear waste in this nation. Groups that have been opposed
to Yucca Mountain from the earliest stages have been especially critical of
the lack of guidance provided by the Yucca Mountain Project Draft
Environmental Impact Statement. 0 Even the Nuclear Waste Technical
Review Board has withheld comment on the DEIS until a thorough
analysis of the proposed routes and methods is promulgated by the
DOE. 17 1 For its part, the OCRWM has accepted the comments of all

165 See id. Summarizing the scope of the affected population, the Factsheet
reports:
The transport of [SNF] and [HLW] to the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository site in Southern Nevada has the potential to impact
communities across the nation. Studies by the State of Nevada and the
[DOE] indicate that 43 states would be directly impacted by thousands
of SNF and HLW shipments to the proposed Yucca Mountain
repository. At least 109 cities with populations over 100,000 plus
thousands of smaller communities could be affected by such shipments.
Id.

166 Id.

See Letter from Amy Shollenberger, Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy and
Environment Program, to Wendy Dixon, EIS Project Manager, RE: Comments on the
Draft Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for Nuclear Waste at
Yucca Mountain (Feb. 25, 2000), at http://www.citizen.org/CMEP/RAGE/radw
aste/DEISYuccaComments.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Shollenberger
Letter] ("The DEIS does not identify the preferred mode of transportation (rail or truck)
and does not identify the specific routes for the shipping campaign that would be initiated
if Yucca Mountain is approved.").
168 See YMP DEIS, supranote
6.
169 Id.
170 See Shollenberger Letter, supra note 167.
171 See U.S. NUCLEAR WASTE TECHNICAL REV. BD., REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS
167

AND THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY (1999).
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interested groups, but has not provided any further guidance regarding the
proposed transportation methods or routes.
Recent court decisions have reinforced the often-stated position of
activists opposing any large-scale transportation of SNF. Transportation
of nuclear waste through any area on a regular basis causes environmental
harm. In one high profile case, the New Mexico State Supreme Court
upheld an award for damages due to the partial taking of property from
landowners who lived near the transportation route from Los Alamos
Nuclear Labs to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project ("WIPP") in New
Mexico. 172 The DOE conceived the WIPP in 1979 and, after its own
extensive saga of battling local resistance, the WIPP has recently begun to
accept radioactive waste. 173 The WIPP accepts "transuranic" wastes; too
radioactive to be disposed of in shallow burial sites but not meeting the
requirements for long-term storage of SNF and HLW. 1 74 The court in the
WIPP case upheld an action whereby property owners asserted a Fifth
Amendment taking had occurred to their property because of the
continuous transport of highly radioactive waste nearby. 175 Significantly,
the court authorized the award of compensation based upon a loss of
market value, even though the loss was based on fears and not on
objective standards. 176 The New Mexico court has decided no other cases
172

Santa Fe v. Kornis, 845 P.2d 753 (N.M. 1992).
Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-579, 106

173Waste

Stat. 4777 (1992).
174

See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(ee) (1994). It states that:
The term "transuranic waste" means material contaminated with
elements that have an atomic number greater than 92, including
neptunium, plutonium, americium, and curium, and that are in
concentrations greater than 10 nanocuries per gram, or in such other
concentrations as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may prescribe to
protect the public health and safety.

Id.
175

See Komis, 845 P.2d at 755. According to the appellate court summary of the facts of

the matter:
The property was condemned on November 14, 1988 and the highest
and best use at that time was speculative investment for subdivision
into rural homesites or for recreational purposes. The property was
appropriated to permit construction of a bypass around the City. The
bypass will be used to transport hazardous nuclear waste from Los

Alamos to the WIPP site.
Id.
176 Id. at 756. The court stated:

If a loss of value can be proven, it should be compensable regardless of
its source. Thus, if people will not purchase property because they fear
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regarding the taking of property due to transport of radioactive waste, but
it seems reasonably certain that many of the same types of actions will
177
commence as the date for SNF transport nears in Nevada.
These concerns go against the record of transportation of SNF. For
over forty years, the military has transferred SNF by rail and truck' 78 and
the commercial industry has a long record of SNF transportation as
well. 179 Since the beginning of the nuclear industry, not one serious
accident involving the transfer of SNF has occurred, and the record
continues to date.18 However, this stellar record should not relieve the
DOE and OCRWM from their obligation to develop an effective,
coherent, and applicable plan for the transport of waste to Yucca
Mountain. Until the DOE selects a definite method and route for all SNF
that they will be required to transport, no meaningful critique of future
plans can commence.
C.

TransportationCasks and Canisters

Closely intertwined with the issues raised by an investigation of
proposed transportation routes and methods is the choice of container in
which to transport the SNF or HLW. Whether the transport is by rail or by
truck will significantly affect the choice of shipping container, as rail
shipment containers may be several times larger than those carried by
legal weight trucks.18 1 The first line of defense against an accident
involving the release of radioactive materials is the shipping container and
the selection of containers for shipment of all types of nuclear waste has
living or working on or near a WIPP route, or if a buyer can be found,
but only at a reduced price, a loss of value exists.

id.

For an extended discussion of the issues surrounding the liabilities generated by
the
transportation of nuclear waste, see Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting
177

of Hazardous and Radioactive Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a
Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1047 (1994).
178 U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM'N, PUBLIC INFORMATION CIRCULAR FOR SHIPMENTS
OF
IRRADIATED REACTOR FUEL,
INFORMATION CIRCULAR].

NUREG-0725

(1996)

at 2 [hereinafter

PUBLIC

utilities with multiple reactors store all SNF for each facility at one site. This
involves rail or truck shipments on the same scale as would be required in shipments to
179Many

the YMP. Also, after the 1979 partial meltdown at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania,
the DOE transported portions of the melted fuel to Idaho for inspection. Id.
180See PUBLIC INFORMATION CIRCULAR, supra note 178.
181

See YMP DEIS, supra note 6, at 6-5. The DEIS also envisions a transportation plan

that could transfer rail cask to "heavy-haul" trucks for short distances in Nevada. Id.
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been a concern of the NRC for many decades.' 8 2 Not by coincidence, the

NRC also publishes a list of approved casks for storage of SNF at on-site
storage facilities.1 83 These two purposes-transportation and temporary
storage-have been combined to create "dual-purpose" casks that have
become the industry standard. 184 Most new cask designs for temporary
storage of SNF are of the dual-purpose variety, 185 perhaps because of the
economic uncertainty of a date when the DOE will ultimately remove the

SNF from on-site storage facilities.
The DOE has not been blind to the opportunity created by a single
cask that serves several functions, otherwise termed a "multi-purpose
canister" ("MPC"). If a single cask could be designed for temporary

storage at existing reactor sites, transportation to Yucca Mountain and
long-term storage, it could save the government and utilities millions of
dollars in duplicative costs over the next several years. As early as 1994,
the DOE suggested that it could partially compensate utilities for its delay
in accepting SNF in 1998 by providing MPCs to plants that required

additional storage capacity.186 The DOE planned to design the sealed
182 See, e.g., PUBLIC INFORMATION CIRCULAR, supra note 178.
183 See generally 10 C.F.R. §§ 72.230-48 (2000) (listing procedures and testing required

for the approval of spent fuel storage casks at independent spent fuel storage
installations).
184 Even the DOE insists that the spent fuel it receives form PECO in the DOE-PECO
agreement will be contained in dual-purpose casks. See DOE-PECO AMENDMENT, supra
note 75. The Amendment reads at the critical part, "DOE shall only take title to Peach
Bottom SNF/HLW that is contained in a dual-purpose cask system certified by the
Commission for storage and transport under 10 CFR Parts 71 and 72." Id. at.7.
185 See DOE TRANSPORTATION PLAN, supra note 101, at app. A.
186 See Notice of Inquiry: Waste Acceptance Issues, 59 Fed. Reg. 27,007 (May 25,
1994).
The Department recognizes that there are a number of potential forms
of cost sharing arrangements, but at this time, the Department has not
reached a decision whether to proceed with, nor is it predisposed to,
any particular form of cost sharing. Currently, the Department is
evaluating a design for multi-purpose canisters ("MPC") to support
spent nuclear fuel transportation, storage and disposal. The MPC offers
the potential for considerable standardization, simplification and,
consequently, cost savings for both utilities and the Federal waste
management system. Given the potential benefits of the MPC, the
Secretary has directed that the options to be explored by the
Department should include, to the maximum extent possible, the
provision and use of MPCs to address both schedule and cost concerns
arising from the potential unavailability of a repository or an MRS in
1998.
Id. 27,009.
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canisters to fit into different shielded "overpacks" for storage,
transportation, and permanent disposal. 8 7 Unfortunately for all involved,
sharp budget cuts in FY 1996 forced the DOE to abandon the project due
88
to the high design and start-up costs.'
It is clearly time to resurrect the MPC program. 'The DOE's own
report on the transfer and storage of SNF encourages manufacturers to
89
fabricate multipurpose casks that can be used for transfer and storage.1
Immediate DOE purchase and delivery of MPCs to the utilities will have
three economic advantages. First, it will prevent the utilities from
purchasing their own dry casks that may later need to be discarded
following DOE approval of a suitable long-term storage cask. 190 Second,
courts and utilities may use the purchase of the canisters as part of an
equitable method for payment of damages in current litigation. I Finally,
the DOE would immediately begin funding a portion of the nuclear waste
disposal program that will ultimately achieve the end goal of long-term
storage and not simply analysis and design.
V.

CONCLUSION

The broad plan to dispose of spent nuclear fuel articulated by the
Congress in the NWPA has created significant challenges for the DOE.
The process of selecting and preparing a site for long-term storage has
proved both enormously controversial and costly. After more than
fourteen years of analysis of Yucca Mountain and the surrounding
environment, the DOE has failed to even approve the site. 192 In terms of
actual approval or construction, the plan for transporting and storage of the
waste is no closer to completion now than it was when the NWPA was
93
first proposed. 1
The DOE must promulgate concrete plans and specifications for
the transportation of SNF and HLW from the seventy-seven reactor sites
throughout the country. Currently the draft environmental impact
187 See CRS TEMPORARY STORAGE REPORT, supra note 155.
188

Id.
DOE TRANSPORTATION REPORT, supra note 101.
See CRS TEMPORARY STORAGE REPORT, supra note 155.

189 See
190

191 See Northern States Power Co. v. Dep't of Energy, 128 F.3d
754, 760 (D.C. Cir.

1997). The court believed that it was up to the parties involved to negotiate a settlement
rather than enforce a court ordered judgment. Id.
192 See generally YMP DEIS, supra note 6.
193 See generally DOE TRANSPORTATION REPORT, supra note 101.
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statement offers only a number of options from which the DOE may
choose before operation of the repository. This indecision not only makes
reasoned analysis of the DOE's plans impossible at the present time, but
the failure to promote concrete proposals will likely require several
supplemental environmental impact statements prior to the beginning of
SNF transport. Similarly, the selection of long-term storage casks and
facility design (commonly referred to as "waste packaging") should
provide a single, reliable design to ensure the safety of the public and the
environment. Ideally the DOE should consider the use of MPCs to
minimize the economic waste and delays that will result if utilities adopt
several different packaging designs.
After successful court challenges to the DOE in Maine Yankee
Atomic Power Co. and other actions, the investor-owned nuclear utilities
of the U.S. appear to be in a strong position to force the government to
begin to accept waste or to pay damages. Since 1994, attempts by the
DOE to negotiate a settlement have received little or no interest and a
single amended settlement contract is now challenged by other third-party
utilities. Both legally and equitably, utilities have every right to enforce
the terms agreed to and paid for by the Standard Contract. But nuclear
energy has never been a popular form of electric power production in large
part due to the public perception of the dilemma posed by nuclear waste.
Storing spent nuclear fuel at seventy-seven sites throughout the country
will not make these reactors any better neighbors in their respective
communities. Utilities should realize they have much to gain by resolving
differences with the DOE and making a valid attempt at an equitable
settlement.
The DOE and utilities should create several priorities for
themselves in future agreements between the parties. First, they should
agree that no amendment to the Standard Contract should include a
reduction in fees to the NWF. The NWF serves the purposes of all
involved in the disposal of SNF and the contributions to the fund ensure
the continued progress toward the goal of constructing and operating the
Yucca Mountain Project. Second, they should agree that in the interest of
the prevention of economic waste, those facilities that are waiting on
transfer of SNF to complete decommissioning should be relieved first,
perhaps before the construction of Yucca Mountain by removal to another
suitable government site such as Savannah River or the Idaho Labs.
Finally, the DOE should take title to all SNF stored at utility sites in dry
casks and should immediately begin a plan to fabricate and provide multipurpose canisters to nuclear utilities for current storage and future transfer
of SNF. Ideally, the final environmental impact statement for the Yucca
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Mountain Project and the final transportation plan should be coordinated
to require the use of the same type of cask or canister. Four years before
the contracted opening, the DOE once had the foresight to attempt to
reconcile the inability to open the repository on schedule with economic
considerations of all parties involved. Now four years after the contracted
opening, DOE must once again take the lead in proposing a valid
settlement.
Congress developed the policies and regulations of the NWPA in
part to ensure that the producers of SNF and HLW suffered the costs
inherent in the long-term storage required for disposal of the waste. The
decisions in Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. and other actions make clear
that the federal courts intend to hold the government accountable for the
delay in accepting nuclear waste for disposal. If the DOE and the nuclear
utilities can not agree to an equitable arrangement for the negotiation of
the terms of the Standard Contract, the costs for disposal will likely be
borne by the taxpayers of the United States. Further delay by the DOE
will cause only further financial hardship to the DOE and the citizens of
the nation.

